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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of Califnoia.
BARRETT v. MARKET ST. C. RY. CO.
The rules and regulations of a carrier of passengers must be reasonable, and
the carrier must deal in a reasonable manner with the persons carried.
It would be unreasonable for a street railway company to require passengers
upon its cars to tender the exact fare charged, and to refuse to make change for
notes or coin of a reasonable amount.
The tender of a five dollar gold piece or legal tender note is not unreasonable,
and a railway company is bound to supply its conductors with sufficient money to
change a coin or note of that denomination.
A distinction as to what is a reasonable tender, exists between railroads, where
passengers may pay their fares at a ticket office, and street railways, where they
are obliged to pay upon the cars.
Appeal from Superior Court, City and County of San
Francisco.
W. H. L. Barnes, for appellant.
Stanley, Stoney & Hayes, for respondent.
PATTERSON, J., November 26, 1889. Action for damages
for the forcible ejection of plaintiff from one of defendant's
cars. The defense was that the plaintiff had refused to pay his
fare, and that, therefore, the defendant was justified in ejecting
him. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the
defendant appeals upon the findings. The material portions
of the findings are as follows:
"That while in said car, as such passenger, and when said car was near the
comer of Second and Market streets, the conductor in charge of said car, on be-
half of the defendant, did, in the course of his employment as such conductor,
demand of the plaintiff the payment of the sum of 5 cents, being the legal fare
and cost of transportation on said car. That said plaintiff did not have in his
possession any coin or currency of the exact value of 5 cents, or any coin of any
smaller denomination than a $5 gold-piece, lawful money of the United States,
and plaintiff, in response to said demand of said conductor, offered said conductor
a $5 gold-piece, and told said conductor to take his (plaintifi's) fare out of said
sum of $5. That the conductor refused to accept said $5 gold-piece, informing
the plaintiff that he was unable to- make change for said $5 gold-piece, and in-
sisted upon the payment to him by the plaintiff of the exact sum of 5 cents, at the
same time directing plaintiff if he did not produce and pay said sum of 5 cents to
leave the car. That the plaintiff informed the conductor that the $5 gold-piece
was the smallest coin he had; that he was willing to pay his fare, but could not
furnish theexact amount; and refused to leave the carupon the demand of the con-
ductor. That thereupon the conductor stopped said car, and called the driver to
his assistance, and both of them thereupon seized the plaintiff, and, against his
protest, opposition, and struggles, forcibly ejected him from said oar at the comer
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of said Second and Market streets, and in so doing inflicted upon plaintiff various
bruises and injuries. * * * And the Court finds from the foregoing facts alone
that the plaintiff did not refuse to pay fare for his transportation on said car, and did
not insist upon any right, or supposed right, to be transported free of charge,
under any circumstances or upon any condition, and that plaintiff was not ejected
or put out of said car for a refusal to pay his fare. And as a conclusion of law,
from the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment,"
etc. It is stipulated by counsel "sthat, if plaintiff were entitled to damages, $500
was a fair and just estimate thereof."
The question on the merits to which counsel have mainly
directed their arguments is whether the passenger was bound to
tender the exact fare. It is argued for the appellant, that the
rule in relation to the performance of contracts applies, and
that the exact sum must be tendered. But we do not think
so. The fare can be demanded in advance as well as at a sub-
sequent time: Civil Code, § 2187. And, so far as this ques-
tion is concerned, we see no difference in principle where the
fare is demanded in advance and where it is demanded subse-
quently. If it be demanded in advance, there is no con-
tract. The carrier simply refuses to make a contract. Con-
sequently, the rule in relation to the performance of con-
tracts, whatever it be, has no necessary application. The'
obligation of the carrier in such case would be that which the
law imposes on every common carrier, viz., that he must, "if
able to do so, accept and carry whatever is offered to him, at
a reasonable time and place, of a kind that he undertakes or is
accustomed to carry:'" Id. § 2169. This duty, like every other
which the law imposes, must have a reasonable performance;
and we do not think it would in all cases be reasonable for the
carrier to demand the exact fare as a condition of carriage.
Suppose that on entering a street-car a person should tender
the sum of IO cents? Would it be reasonable for the carrier
to refuse it? Prior to the act of 1878, the usual fare was 6Y
cents. In such a case it would be unreasonable for the carrier
to demand the exact fare; for there is no coin in the country
which would enable the passenger to answer such a demand.
It would be impossible for the passenger to furnish such a
sum. Consequently, to allow the carrier to maintain such a
demand, would be to allow him to refuse to perform the duty
which the law imposes upon him. The fare which he is now
allowed to charge is no longer the sum mentioned. The act of
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1878 forbids him to "charge or collect a higher rate than 5
cents." But there is nothing to prevent a lower rate from being
charged. The carrier might fix it at 4Y cents, and in such a
case it would be equally impossible for the passenger to com-
ply with such a demand as in the case above put. Conse-
quently, it will not do to lay down the rule that the passen-
ger is obliged to tender the exact fare.
But it does not follow that the passenger may tender any
sum, however large. If he should tender a $ioo bill, for
example, it would be clear that the carrier would not be bound
to furnish change. The true rule must be, not that the pas-
senger must tender the exact fare, but that he must tender a
reasonable sum, and that the carrier must accept such tender,
and must furnish change to a reasonable amount. The obli-
gation to furnish a reasonable amount of change must be con-
sidered as one which the law imposes from the nature of the
business. Section 2188 of the Civil Code provides that "a
passenger who refuses to pay his fare, or to conform to any
lawful regulation of the carrier, may be ejected from the vehicle
by the carrier." The question is whether the findings show a
refusal to pay,-whether the tender of a $5 gold-piece was
sufficient.
It is claimed by appellant that the establishment of the rule
contended for by the respondent would lead to great inconveni-
ence, and make it the duty of the carrier of persons for hire in
street-cars to provide its conductors with sufficient small coin
to do a general exchange business with all passengers; thus
requiring the company to intrust, to a class of employes who
are usually of no pecuniary responsibility, large sums of
money. It is further said, that if the tender of a $5 gold-
piece is a tender of the amount actually due, and the conductor
is bound to receive it and return $4.95 to the passenger, the
same principle would apply to the offer by the passenger of
$io or $20 in gold or currency. With the question of con-
venience, however, we have nothing to do, except in so far as
it bears upon the question whether the amount tendered was a
reasonable sum, such as the carrier was bound to accept. It
does not follow, if it be established as a rule, that $5 is a rea-
sonable amount to be tendered to a conductor, that $20 or $5o
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is also a reasonable amount, and must be accepted. The fears
of the appellant are based upon the assumption that passen-
gers generally will contumaciously, to avoid the payment of
fare, and require the companies to carry them free, offer coin of
a large denomination. But these fears, we think, can be safely set
aside upon the theory that a question like this will, as is usual,
settle itself by a spirit of mutual accommodation between
carrier and passenger. It is a well-known fact, that the $5
gold-piece is practically the lowest gold coin in use .in this
section of the country.
The case upon which the appellant relies, Fulton v. Grand
Trunk Ry. CO. (1858), 17 U. C. Q. B. 428, is not quite
in point. 'In that case the plaintiff had boarded a train
of cars without a ticket, and when asked for his fare
declined paying it, as he said he had not made up his mind
how far he should go. The conductor told him that he must
decide, and afterwards, on his declining again on the same
ground, stopped the train and put him off. The plaintiff then
tendered the conductor a $20 gold-piece, telling him to take
his fare, $1.35, out of it. Under these circumstances, the Court
very properly held, that the plaintiff had refused to pay his
fare, within the meaning of a statute very much like our own,
and that the conductor was justified in refusing to carry him
further. The Court said-
"The general practice is for the passengers to pay at the office, and get tickets,
* * and a person rushing into a car without a ticket has no reason to expect
that he will find the conductor prepared to change a $2o gold-piece, for he relies
upon receiving tickets from the parties, or, if money is to be paid to him instead,
that it will he paid with reasonable regard to what is convenient under the circum-
stances."
A distinction ought to be made, we think, between passen-
gers traveling on steam railroads and those traveling on street
railroads. Passengers of the former class are expected to
prepare themselves with tickets procured at the regular office
established at the station where the trains regularly stop.
Horse-cars and cable-cars stop at all points along the road at
the beck of those desiring to ride, and the conductors do not,
as a general thing, expect to receive tickets for the passage.
Judgment and order affirmed.
We concur: Fox, J.; WORKS, J.
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As a general rule, in order to con-
stitute a valid tender, the exact amount
due must be offered: 17 AmER. LAW
REG. 745,749. The debtor cannot
tender a bank note or coin for a larger
amount than the debt, and require
change to be made: Betterbee v. Davis
(ISI), 3 Camp. 70; Robinson v.
Cak (1815), 6 Taunt. 336. Butwhile
a railway company, by permitting a
passenger to board its car without
demanding the payment of his fare in
advance, actually establishes between
itself and him the relation of debtor
and creditor, the enforcement of a rule
requiring the tender of the exact fare
would be impracticable, and such a rule
would undoubtedly be pronounced un-
reasonable by the courts. In Tarbell
v. Central Pacigfc R. R. Co. (x868),
34 Cal. 616, the passenger tendered
the conductor the amount of his fare in
United States legal tender notes. The
conductor refused to accept them and
demanded coin. This not being pro-
duced, the passenger was ejected, and
subsequently brought suit for damages.
Counsel for the railroad company, while
admitting that a common carrier is
bound to carry all properly behaved
persons on payment or tender of their
fare, argued that, before the transpor-
tation is completed, there is no "debt"'
within the meaning of the Legal
Tender Acts, on the part of the passen-
ger, and that therefore a tender of
United States notes was not sufficient
and the company was justified in the
ejection. In support of this contention
they cited the case of Perry v. W/as/h-
burn (1862), 20 Cal. 318 (approved by
the Supreme Court ofthe United States in
Lane County v. Oregon (I868), 7 Wall.
(74 U. S.) 71, and subsequent cases),
where it was held that taxes levied
under State authority did not constitute
a debt within the meaning of the Legal
Tender Acts. But the Court held that
"the point that the defendant was not
bound to carry the plaintiff because the
fare which he offered to pay was in
legal tender "notes, is not tenable. *
* * There being no contract in writ-
ing stipulating for coin, we find nothing
in the case which takes it out of the
operation of the Act of Congress in
relation to legal tender notes. Railroad
fares are not taxes, and do not fall
within the rule in Perry v. WVashbur z
(suipra). Whether the defendant could
have legally exacted payment in coin
before the plaintiff was admitted into
the cars and the journey commenced, is
a question not involved in this case, and
upon which we express no opinion.
Having received the plaintiff and pro-
ceeded several miles upon the journey,
the defendant must be held to have con-
sented to receive in payment of the fare
any good and lawful money which the
plaintiff might tender, when called upon
for payment. The kind of money tobe
paid had then ceased to be an open
question, for the contract was already
made and in process of performance."
To the same effect is the recent case
of M5organ v. Jersey Ciy &- B. Ry.
Co., decided by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, November 13, 1889. There
the passenger tendered a silver coin,
worn smooth by use. The conductor
refused to azcept it, and, upon the pas-
senger declining to tender other money,
eje&ed him from the car. Upon the trial
of a suit for damages, the Court in-
structed the jury as follows: "The
plaintiff tendered this ten-cent piece, a
genuine and recognizable coin of the
United States, and that was his lawful
fare, provided that you believe that the
coin is in the condition in which it was
when issued from the mint, except as
it has been changed by proper use. If
there has been no other abrasion, no
other defacement of that coin, except
such as it has received in the passing
from hand to hand, then it is still, under
the laws of the country, a good ten-
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cent piece, and was the fare of the
plaintiff. If you think it has been
,therwise changed, willfully changed, it
has ceased to be a lawful coin of the
country, and it has ceased to be a law-
ful tender." The Supreme Court held
this instruction to be substantially cor-
rect. The opinion is well worth quot-
ing at length : "By the Act of March
3, 1875 (Rev. Stat. U. S. 3586), the
silver coins of the United States shall,
be a legal tender, at their nominal
value, for any amount, not exceeding
five dollars, in any one payment. By
the Act of January 9, 1879 (Supp.
Rev. Stat. U. S. 488), the holder of any
of the silver coins of the United States
of smaller denomination than one
dollar may, on presentation of the same
in sums of twenty dollars, or any mul-
tiple thereof, at the office of the Treas-
urer of the United States, receive
therefor lawful money of the United
States. Section 3 increases the le-
gal tender of silver coin to the sum of
ten dollars, instead of five dollars,
under the previous statute. In Section
3585 of the Revised Statutes, the gold
coins of the United States are made a
legal tender in all payments at their
nominal value, when not below the
standard weight and limit of tolerance
for the single piece; and, when reduced
in weight below such standard and
tolerance, shall be a legal tender at
valuation in proportion to their actual
weight. The limit of toleration for
gold coin referred to is found in
Sections 3505 and 35H1, to be, when
reduced in weight by natural abrasion,
not more than one-half of one per
centum below the standard weight pre-
scribed by law, after a circulation of
twenty-years, as shown by the date of
coinage, and at a ratable proportion for
any period less than twenty years. This
particularity in the limitation and allow-
ance as to gold coin is not found in the
case of natural abrasion in silver coins.
This difference is very n6ticeable and
important in a question of statutory con-
struction and legislative intention. It
seems by these statutes that, so long as
a genuine silver coin is worn only by
natural abrasion, is not appreciably
diminished in weight, and retains the
appearance of a coin duly issued from
the mint, it is a legal tender for its
original value: U. S. v. Lissner (1882),
U. S. Circ. Crt. D. Mass., 12 Fed.
Repr. 840. The coin in question
in this case was shown in court to
the jury. It does not appear in the
evidence to have been so worn that it
was light in weight, or not distinguish-
able as a genuine dime. With no
limitation put upon its circulation by
the Government, it would seem that
none was intended, so long as it was
not defaced, cut, or mutilated, and
was only made smooth by constant and
long-continued handling, while being
circulated as part of the national cur-
rency. The instruction was right, as
the facts appear, qnd as the jury found
them."
In both the cases cited, the relation
subsisting between the carrier and the
passenger, after the latter had entered
the car without pre-payment of his fare,
was recognized to be that of creditor
and debtor. Consequently the passen-
ger was required to offer to pay his
fare in the legal tender of the country,
and the carrier, when such a tender
was made, was bound to accept it. As
has been already stated, a strict appli-
cation of the rules of tender, would
justify the carrier in refusing to accept
anything except the exact amount of the
fare. But another principle here comes
into play and must be recognized. It is
this principle which sustains the ruling
in the principal case. Reasmiablenzess
must characterize all the dealings of a
common carrier with its passengers. It
has the power to make rules and regu-
lations to guide and govern its agents
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in the discharge of their duties and for
the conduct of passengers while upon
its cars or conveyances, but such rules
and regulations must be reasonable:
Wheeler on Carriers, 130-1-2. " Regu-
lations will be deemed reasonable,
which are suitable to enable them
(carriers) to perform the duties they
undertake, and to secure their own just
rights in such employment; and also such
as are necessary and proper to insure
the safety and promote the comfort of
passengers :" Commonwealth v. Power
(1844), 7 let. (Mass.) 596; State v.
Chovin (1858), 7 Iowa 204. So also the
regulations of the carrier must be en-
forced in a reasonable manner, and its
treatment of its passengers must in all
cases be characterized by this same
quality of reasonableness. Thus in
several cases it has been held that,
where a passenger, who has purchased
a ticket, but is unable to find it at the
moment of the conductor's demand for
its production, is entitled to be allowed
reasonable time to make search for it:
Maples v. New York 6 .H. R. R.
Co. (I871), 38 Conn. 557; Hayes v.
New York Cent. &- H. R. R. R. Co.
(S. Ct. N. Y. x884), io Alb. Law Jour.
469 ; International G. N R. R.1. Co.
v. Wilkes (1887), 68 Tex. 617.
A passenger who has neither ticket
nor money is also entitled to reasonable
time in whichto borrow the sum needed
from other passengers, if he requests to
be permitted to do so: Curly. Chicago,
R. .& P. R. R. Co. (1884), 63 Iowa
417; Clark v. Wilmington &- Weldon
R. R. Co. (i885), 91 N. C. 5o6.
An interesting case is Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co. v. Garrett (i88I),
8 Lea (Tenn.) 438. The plaintiffhad
there boarded a train without ticket or
money, but having a tax certificate,
which he supposed would be accepted
for his fare, but which the conductor re-
fused to receive. The latter also re-
fused to allow him to proceed to the
next station, where he stated that he
could get money. As the conductor
was ejecting him, another passenger
offered to pay the fare, but the con-
ductor would not accept it. The Court
said: "The fact of a party getting on
a passenger car for the purpose of travel,
of itself creates by operation of law a
contract, or the law defines the terms of
the contract, the obligations of which
bind both parties. On the part of the
carrier, among other things, the party iT
entitled to be carried with the care re-
quired by law, at the established rates
and with no unnecessary delay. On
the part of the passenger, he is bound
as the first duty to pay, or offer, or be
willing to pay his fare according
to such reasonable regulations as
may be established by the company.
Payment, when demanded, is his duty.
The receipt of the compensation is the
right of the carrier, and this is a condi-
tion precedent, without the performance
of which he is not bound to perform
the service. * * * The principle
is, the carrier is bound to carry, but is
entitled to his pay-when this is offered,
the law imposes the duty. This being
conceded, it seems to follow that * *
* if another person offered to pay the
fare before ejection from the car, the
carrier was bound ro receive it and
transport the passenger. It is unimpor-
tant to the carrier from whom the money
comes. If it is the proper amount, he
gets what he is entitled to, and must
perform the duty imposed. * * *
To test this further, however, suppose a
carrier should make a regulation that
none but money from the pocket of the
passengerhimself should be received by
conductors on passenger trains, and if
money should be offered by a friend to
pay a party's fare, it should be rejected,
no one could hesitate to say such aregu-
lation would be void as unreasonable,
and beyond the power of the company
to make. If such a rule could not be
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properly made, the act of a conductor
in such a case, without a regulation to
that effect, cannot be justified. * * *
Public policy, the interest and rights of
of the public, as well as the known
conditions surrounding the business of
carrying passengers by railroads in this
country, demand that no narrow or
technical rules should be prescribed to
enable them to exercise any arbitrary
authority whatever in the performance
of their duties growing out of their re-
lation to the public. On the other
hand, every principle of fairness and
right demands that the carrier should
be sustained in enforcing such reasona-
able regulations as may by experience
be found necessary and proper in the
conduct and management of the vast
machinery to be administered in carry-
ing on this complicated and responsible
business."
Questions as to what is, or is not
reasonable, are sometimes determinable
by the Court and sometimes by the jury.
In the principal case the Court held, as a
matter of law, that it would be unreas-
onable to require a passenger to tender
the exact fare and that the carrier must
be prepared to furnish change to a reas-
onable amount, and further that five
dollars was such a reasonable amount,
so that the tender of a five dollar gold-
piece, or note, was reasonable.
In the case referred to in the opinion
of the Court (Fulton v. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co. (1858), 17 U. C. Q. D. 428), it
was also as a matter of law held, that
the tender of a twenty-dollar gold piece
in payment of fare amounting to one
dollar and twenty-five cents" was not a
reasonable offer to pay," requiring, as it
did, more than eighteen dollars to be
paid back in change. Even the officer
attending at the ticket office " might
reasonably object to the oiler of a
twenty-dollar gold piece in order that
one dollar and thirty-five cents might
be taken out of it. If any or all of the
passengers mightput him to the trouble
of giving back so much change as that
it would be impossible that the business
could be transacted with the expedition
which is necessary, or with proper
caution." Much less reasonable would
it be to require the conductor to be pre-
pared to make change to such an
amount.
Thus, it appears that the question to
be determined is recognized in both cases
to be, what is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. This is emphasized in the
principal case by reference to the fact
that this question might have to be an-
swered differently in the case of steam
railroads, where fares may be paid at
the ticket office, and street railways,
where they are payable only upon the
cars. '"hile in each of these cases the
Court very properly treats the question
of reasonableness as one of law, circum-
stances might be readily conceived
which would render the reasonableness
of the amount tendered a question of
fact, to be submitted to the jury.
In a number of cases the duty of a
street railway to deal with its passen-
gers in a reasonable manner, has been
recognized and enforced by the courts.
In all v. Second and Third Sts. P.
Ry. Co. (1883), 14 %V. N. C. (Pa.) 242,
where a passefnger, in handing his fare
to the conductor, dropped the coin into
the straw upon the floor of the car, the
Court held that he was entitled to re-
main upon the car for a reasonable
length of time to search for the coin,
before he could be ejected for non-pay-
ment of fare. In Corbett v. Tweno-
third St. Ry. Co. (1886), 42 Hun. (N.
Y.) 587, the facts were as follows:
The passenger, on entering a car which
was operated by a driver without a
conductor, put into the box used for
that purpose five fares for himself and
three companions. Upon discovering
his mistake and applying to the driver
for the restitution of the excessive fare
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placed in the box, the driver refused to
restore it, alleging that he had no au-
thority to return the fare or correct the
mistake, and directed the passenger to
repair to the office of the company for
his money. During a wordy alterca-
tion between the passenger and the
driver, which followed the latter's re-
.fusal to return the fare, a lady entered
the car and delivered her five cents fare
to the passenger who placed it in his
pocket, and, upon his refusal to deposit
it in the box, the driver ejected him
from the car and delivered him into the
custody of a policeman. A regulation
of the company required a passenger
thus deprived of his money by his own
mistake, to go to the office of the com-
pany for reimbursement. The Court
held that "the plaintiff was clearly
entitled to a restitution of the money
deposited by him by mistake in the box
placed in the car to receive the fare of
the passengers, and, as the driver him-
self was not authorized to return the
fare, and in that manner correct the
mistake, it was an entirely reasonable
course to adopt for the plaintiff to re-
ceive the fare, which he did of the
other passenger, and in that manner
reimburse himself for the money inad-
vertently placed in the box. The regu-
lation of the railway company requiring
a passenger, who may be deprived of
his money by his own mistake in this
manner, to go to the office of the com-
pany for its reimbursement and the cor-
rection of the mistake, is entirely un-
reasonable. * * * As long as the
company does not authorize the driver
himself to rectify the mistake, it is no
more than reasonable that the passenger
should be at liberty to do so by receiv-
ing, for that purpose, the fare of any
passenger afterwards entering the car."
In the case of .3forris v. Atlantic Ave.
R. R. Co. (1889), ix6 N. Y. 552, a
rule of the company imposing an extra
charge for packages brought upon its
cars and "too large to be carried on
the lap of the passenger without incom-
moding others," was considered. The
Court say: "' For the successful opera-
tion of the road, and for the accommo-
dation and comfort of its passengers,
certain regulations are evidently essen-
tial. The one in question was reason-
able, but that portion of it relating.to
the present case is indefinite in so far
that it does not in terms furnish all the
information necessary to its execution,
which is dependent upon the fact that
the package is too large to be carried in
the lap of the passenger without incom-
moding others. A package may be
such and so large as to require the con-
clusion that it is within the rule, which
entitles the company to demand the in-
creased fare, and in such case the Court
might, as matter of law, so determine.
When it does not necessarily so appear,
the question arising, in that respect, be-
comes one of fact to be otherwise dis-
.posed of. In the present case * * *
the question was for the jury to deter-
mine whether the extent of theplaintifi's
package was such as to be embraced
within the meaning of the regulation."
It has been frequently decided that
the conductor of a street car has the
power to expel a passenger whose con-
dition and conduct, either by reason of
intoxication or other cause, are "such
as to give a reasonable ground of belief
that his presence and continuance in
the vehicle would create inconvenience
and disturbance and cause discomfort
and annoyance to other passengers :"
Vinton v. .Afiddlesex .. R. Co. (1865),
II Allen (Mass.) 304; Jhuerpkyv. Union
Ry. Co. (1875), IS Mass.228; Lemont
v. Waskingoto &- G. R. R. Co. (1881),
I Mack. (D. C.) x8o. In the last men-
tioned case the Court held that a pas-
senger in a street railway car, who is
unable to sit up and is sick to vomiting,
may lawfully be expelled, whether his
sickness proceed from drunkenness or
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not. "Where the circumstances are of
such a striking character as to give rise
to a reasonable and honest apprehen-
sion of disorder and annoyances from
he conduct and condition of a passenger,
the conductor may exercise his authority
and exclude the offender, in order to
maintain the peace and order of the ve-
hicle intact. It is evident that the police
of horse railway cars, in order to be effi-
cient, must be preventive as well as re-
troactive, and this can only be'done by
allowing the conductor to exercise a
reasonable discretion in order to prevent
acts of impropriety or violence, when
they are likely to occur. A homicidal
lunatic, or a notorious thief, may be
ejected, although they have neither
slain nor robbed. a passenger, if there is
reasonable fear of danger. * * *
The safeguard against an unjust or un-
authorized use of the power is to be
found in the consideration that it can
never be properly exercised, except in
cases where it can be satisfactorily
proved that the condition or conduct of
a person was such as tO render it rea-
sonably certain that he would occasion
discomfort or annoyance to other pas-
sengers, if admitted into a public vehi-
cle or allowed to remain. * * *
Thus we see that reasonable and prob-
able cause will authorize the carrier or
his agents in the business to exercise
the right of exclusion in a proper case,
where a breach of good order might
reasonably be apprehended. * * *
Of course, for an abuse of this discre-
tion-or for any oppression in its exercise,
the company would be responsible."
In Conolly v. Crescent City R. R. Co.
(1888), 41 La. An. 57; S. c. 28 A-mER.
LAW REG. 255, the passenger entered
the car perfectly sober and well-behaved.
While on the car, he was stricken with
apoplexy, accompanied with severe
vomiting, which occasioned serious dis-
comfort and inconvenience to other
passengers. He attempted to leave the
car, but fell upon the floor, where he
remained helpless, speechless, and in-
capable of taking any care of himself.
The driver, assisted by a passenger,
then removed him from the car and
laid him in the street between the car-
track and gutter. It was a bleak, driz-
zling December day, but the driver took
no steps to secure the sick man any
relief or assistance. He simply left
him there, and went his way. The
passenger remained exposed to the
weather for more than four hours, when
the police authorities removed him to
the City Hospital, where he died the
following morning. In affirming ajudg-
ment for damages against the railway
company, the Court said: "When the
condition of a sick passenger is such
that his continued carriage is inconsistent
with the safety, or even the reasonable
comfort, of his fellow-passengers, regard
for the rights of the latter will authorize
the carrier to exclude him from the
conveyance. Thus if he had cholera, or
small-pox, or delirium tremens, or
even if, as in this case, he were subject,
from any cause, to continuous vomiting,
utterly inconsistent with the comfort of
other passengers in a street car, the
right of the carrier in protection of the
latter's privileges to exclude him, would
undoubtedly arise. Such is the reason-
able doctrine of the cases cited. * * *
But none of these cases hold that this
right of exclusion may be exercised
arbitrarily and inhumanely, or without
due care and provision for the safety
and well-being of the ejected passenger.
On the contrary, the duty of exercising
such care and provision is universally
recognized."
The same rule of care must be ob-
served in the ejection of a passenger
who is intoxicated: Converse v. Wash-
inglon &- G. R. R. Co. (1876), 2 Mac
Ar. (D. C.) 504; or where the person
is ejected for non-payment of fare:
Healey v. CitY P. R. R. Co. (1875), 28
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Ohio St. 23. In .lIurpkyv. Union Ry.
Co. (1875), ni8 Mass. 228, the Court
held that "it could not be said as
matter of law that it would be a wrong-
ful act to attempt to eject a person, who
might otherwise be lawfully ejected,
merely because the car was in motion.
"Whether it would be so or not, would
be a question of fact, to be determined
by the jury in view of the rate of speed
at which the car was moving, as well
as the other circumstances."
As already stated, questions as to
what is or what is not reasonable in the
rules or conduct of carriers of passen-
gers, are sometimes determinable by the
Court and sometimes by the jury. But
the cases on this branch of the subject
are not uniform and it is not possible to
lay down an absolute rule. In Day v.
Owenz (185S), 5 Mich. 520, a case fre-
quently cited and followed, the Court
say: -,The reasonableness of a rule or
regulation is a mixed question of law
and fact, to be found by the jury on the
trial, under the instructions of the Court.
It may depend on a great variety of
circumstances, and may not improperly
be said to be in itself a fact to be de-
duced from other facts. It is not to be
inferred from the rule or regulation
itself, but must be shown positively."
The question in that case was as to the
reasonableness of a rule of a steamboat
line, excluding colored persons from
the cabins of its boats.
The other extreme is found in the
views of the Court in Sauth Florida R.
R. Co. v. Rhoads, S. CL Fla., Jan I8,
1889, where it is said: "The reason-
ableness of rules prescribed by railroad
companies, and like corporations with
like powers, is a question of law to he
decided by the courts, and not a ques-
tion of fact to be decided by juries."
The rule there sought to be enforced
was a peculiar one, forbidding the
employes of a competing line of steam-
boats from wearing their uniform caps
or badges upon the cars of the railroad
company. The Court held such rule
unreasonable, saying that "railroad
companies have no right to prescribe
the dress of any passenger."
In each of these cases, the rule
is unquestionably stated too broadly.
There can be no doubt that, in the
majority of instances, the Court must
pass upon the reasonableness of the
rule or regulation ind dispute. But this
is not invariably the case. Circn-
stances may be shown which render it
eminently proper that the question f
reasonableness should be submitted to
the jury. It may, morever, be reason-
able to enforce a rule at one time, and
unreasonable at another. The manner
in which the rule is applied, may also
affect the question of reasonableness.
And in the large number of controver-
sies involving the conduct of a carrier's
servants in their treatment of passengers,
the aid of a jury must often be invoked,
for the purpose of determining whether
certain actions are, or are not, reason-
able under the circumstances shown.
How far the Court should go in par-
ticular cases in passing upon questions
of reasonableness as matter of law, must
be determined by the application of
those general principles which mark
out the dividing line between the res-
pective provinces of the two great co-
administrators of the law.
This annotation has been confined,
so far as possible, to the narrow ques-
tions suggested by the principal case,
in their relation to street railways only.
A full discussion of the general subject
of the right to eject for non-payment of
fare will be found in the annotation to
the case of Butler v. .lanchester S. &
L. Ry. Co. (1888), 28 AMER. LAW
REG. 81. JAMES C. SELLERS.
